This study examines the empirical controversy over the pricing effect of Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O'Hara's (2002) probability of information-based trading, P IN , on a sample of 30,095 firms from 47 countries worldwide. Contrary to the empirical evidence of Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O'Hara, but consistent with that of Duarte and Young (2009), we find no evidence that P IN exhibits a positive effect on a cross-section of expected stock returns in international markets. Alternative information-based trading measures also display no effect on expected stock returns, corroborating our finding that information risk proxied by P IN , in general, has no pricing effect in world markets.
Introduction
suggest that information risk arising from information asymmetry between informed and uninformed investors is systematic and non-diversifiable. Using a rational expectations asset pricing model, they show that more information asymmetry increases the risk faced by uninformed investors since informed investors can shift their portfolio weights to adjust for new information. All else equal, uninformed investors demand a premium to hold shares in firms with higher information asymmetry, since the uninformed expect to lose to the informed and therefore demand to be compensated for this expected loss. Based on a structural microstructure model, Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O'Hara (2002) derive a measure of private information-based trading, the P IN measure, and find a strong positive cross-sectional relationship between expected stock returns and P IN , suggesting that information asymmetry, as measured by P IN , is priced.
Recent theoretical and empirical studies, however, provide results that challenge the evidence that asymmetric information risk embodied in P IN has a pricing effect. Theoretically, Hughes, Liu, and Liu (2007) and Lambert, Leuz, and Verrecchia (2007) yield empirical implications that are at variance with those in Easley and O'Hara (2004) . Specifically, their models imply that information risk is potentially idiosyncratic in nature and hence, fully diversifiable. Empirically, Duarte and Young (2009) find no evidence that supports Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O'Hara's (2002) finding that P IN is associated with priced information risk. 1 They decompose P IN into two components, one related to asymmetric information and one related to illiquidity, and find that only the P IN component related to illiquidity is priced. They therefore argue that liquidity effects unrelated to information asymmetry explain the cross-sectional relation between P IN and expected returns.
Given the extensive applications of P IN , implicitly and explicitly, as a proxy for priced information risk in both finance and accounting literatures, 2 it is imperative that we investigate this contentious issue by subjecting P IN to robust out-of-sample analyses. Thus far, existing empirical studies focus only on the US market, and it is therefore important that we examine the asset Duarte and Young (2009) , or both systematically explain cross-sectional variation in expected stock returns across international markets.
Our study begins by estimating P IN EHO and P IN DY using the methodologies developed by Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O'Hara (2002) and Duarte and Young (2009) on a sample of 30,095 international stocks across 47 countries worldwide. Our estimates of the probability of informed trading for each stock are based on the information in the newly available global intradaily stock transactions data provided by Thomson Reuters Tick History database (TRTH) for the period from 1996 to 2010. While our study represents the first to estimate P IN s for this large cross-section of international firms, one concern is that stocks of these firms are mostly traded on electronic order-driven markets, which might be inconsistent with the market microstructure model of market making in which P IN is derived. As a result, it is possible that our P IN estimates may not actually capture the probability of informed trading for our sample of stocks that we have expected. To address this issue, we conduct two different tests to assess the quality of our P IN estimates. 3
First, following Easley et al. (1996) , we show how well our P IN estimates predict different measures of spreads. Theoretical studies have shown that spreads widen as adverse selection costs caused by informed trading become larger. Thus, we use spreads as a means to verify the quality of our P IN estimates, while controlling for trading volume. Next, we examine the association between P IN estimates and several other proxies of information asymmetry at firm and country levels. If the P IN estimates capture the level of private information, then they should be strongly correlated with other proxies of information asymmetry commonly adopted in the existing literature. Our firm-level proxies for information asymmetry include analysts following, analyst forecast dispersion, press coverage, firm age, index membership, and closely-held ownership, while country-level proxies are a country's accounting standard index, disclosure requirement index, newspapers circulation, capital market governance, and financial transparency factor. We find that our P IN estimates are 3 We thank the referee for this excellent suggestion. strongly correlated with spreads and with firm-and country-level asymmetric-information proxies in predictable ways, indicating the reasonableness of our estimates of the probability of informed trading using order flows from automated trading systems. Even though these analyses suggest that our findings are quite robust, some concerns about the adequacy of P IN estimates still remain.
Our evidence should therefore be interpreted cautiously, keeping these concerns in mind.
We next turn to examining whether the information risk captured by P IN can systematically explain cross-sectional variation in expected stock returns. We conduct two different asset pricing tests. First, we form portfolios of stocks single-sorted on P IN and also double-sorted on a firm's market capitalization and P IN and then compute excess returns and risk-adjusted returns on each of these portfolios. Results indicate no significant differences in excess returns or in risk-adjusted returns between high and low P IN -formed portfolios, even after controlling for the market capitalization of the portfolios. Second, using Fama-MacBeth's (1973) approach, we find that P IN EHO exhibits no significant positive relationship with future realized stock returns. These results are robust to orders submitted by algorithm trading implemented in a multiplicity of markets. Furthermore, consistent with Duarte and Young (2009) , we also find that the asymmetric information component of P IN DY exhibits no significant impact on the cross-section of expected stock returns.
All this evidence therefore provides no support that P IN reflects information risk systematically priced by investors.
Finally, if information risk related to P IN is diversifiable, it is possible that we can find similar evidence when we use alternative information-based trading measures in place of P IN in our asset pricing tests. We exploit the richness of our database to estimate four alternative information-based trading measures drawn from the existing literature, namely Hasbrouck's (1991) measure of relative trade informativeness, Stoll's (1996, 1997) Second, our work adds to a growing empirical literature that successfully applies P IN to explaining various information-based regularities. This measure is used to study informed trading across different markets (Easley, O'Hara, and Srinivas, 1998) and types of securities (Easley et al., 1996) , stock price reactions to public and private news surprises (Vega, 2006) , the information effect of IPO underpricing (Ellul and Pagano, 2006) , the corporate investment sensitivity to stock prices (Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang, 2007) , the impact of Regulation FD on information asymmetry (Duarte et al., 2008) , among others. Our study contributes to this literature by showing that P IN , while not priced, is strongly associated with various proxies of information asymmetry at both firm and country levels.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses the methodologies and estimation of P IN EHO and P IN DY for our sample of 30,095 firms from 47 countries worldwide and then assesses the quality of the two P IN estimates. Section 3 investigates the asset pricing implications of P IN , and Section 4 examines the relation between other trading-based information asymmetry measures and equity prices. The final section summarizes the paper.
The Estimation of P IN EHO and P IN DY Models
This section first describes P IN , which is derived from the market microstructure model of Easley et al. (1996) and Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O'Hara (2002) , and its extension by Duarte and Young (2009) . It then discusses the methodologies and global intradaily transactions data employed in estimating the two measures of P IN , followed by cross-country summary statistics of their estimates. In this section, we also perform several tests to assess the quality of these estimates.
The P IN Model and its Extension
P IN is derived from the structural microstructure model of Easley et al. (1996) and Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O'Hara (2002) and is based on the imbalance between buy and sell orders among investors. 4 The premise of their model is that order imbalances reflect active trading of informed investors, resulting from the arrival of private information. Otherwise, a more stable and balanced order flow is observed if trading is not driven by private information. Therefore, P IN is a firm-level estimate of the probability that an observed trade originates from a privately informed investor, who may have advance knowledge of analysts' reports, proprietary industry or macro forecasts, insider information, superior ability to process public information, among others. Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O'Hara (2002) compute P IN EHO as a fraction of orders that arises from informed investors relative to the overall order flow, 5 as follows.
where α is the probability that a private information event occurs at the beginning of the trading day, µ is the daily arrival rate of orders from informed investors, and ε B and ε S are the daily arrival rates of buy and sell orders from uninformed investors. Duarte and Young (2009) , however, show that the P IN EHO model does not capture the prevalent positive correlation between buyer-and seller-initiated order flows or the large variances of these 4 P IN takes into account patterns in the number of trades, but not trade size. Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O'Hara (2002) show that trade volume reveals little information beyond the number of trades, suggesting that P IN is an adequate proxy for the degree of informed trading. 5 A more detailed discussion of P IN is contained in Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O'Hara (2002) .
order flows. The two authors extend the P IN EHO model to account for the observed volatility and positive correlation between buyer-and seller-initiated order flows by allowing for simultaneous positive shocks to both order flows. This extended model allows them to compute an adjusted measure of asymmetric information (hereafter P IN DY ),
where d is the probability that informed traders receive a positive signal if a private information event occurs on a specific day, µ B is the arrival rate of informed buyers, µ S is the arrival rate of informed sellers, and θ is the probability that a symmetric order shock occurs in the absence of private information, whereas θ is the probability that a symmetric order shock occurs when private information arrives. In the event of symmetric order flow shocks, the additional arrival rate of buys is ∆ B and of sells is ∆ S . Duarte and Young's (2009) extended model also gives rise to an associated probability, P SOS, the unconditional probability that a given trade will come from a shock to both buy and sell order flows,
They find that firms with high P SOS tend to have high Amihud (2002) illiquidity measures on most days, but experience large increases in both buy and sell orders on days with the release of public information. Shocks to both buy and sell orders may occur when traders disagree about the interpretation of a public news event, or when traders coordinate their trades on certain days to reduce transaction costs. Duarte and Young therefore argue that P SOS is effectively a proxy for illiquidity unrelated to asymmetric information.
As the P IN DY model contains twice as many parameters as the P IN EHO model, we follow Duarte and Young (2009) by estimating a parsimonious specification of P IN DY with θ equals θ .
Throughout this study, our analysis employs this model specification as it facilitates the estimation of P IN DY in that its maximum likelihood estimation tends to converge more easily.
P IN Methodology and Global Intraday Data
Based on the maximum likelihood estimation procedure, we estimate both P IN EHO and P IN DY for every available stock using global intradaily stock transactions data from 47 countries worldwide over a 15-year period from January 2, 1996 to December 31, 2010. For a majority of the countries, the global transactions data are available from 1996 onwards. Appendix A lists the starting date of the data for each country.
The global intradaily transactions data are from TRTH, 6 managed by the Securities Industry
Research Center of Asia-Pacific (SIRCA). TRTH provides millisecond-time-stamped tick data of over 5 million equity and equity derivatives instruments worldwide since January 2, 1996, and such data are sourced from the Reuters Integrated Data Network, which obtains feeds directly from the exchanges. TRTH has an equity coverage of 250 regular stock exchanges in more than 100 countries.
As constrained by the availability of price data from Datastream and financial information from the Worldscope, our study only focuses on all securities listed in the main exchanges of 47 countries, and these stock exchanges are listed in Appendix A. For China, Japan, and the United States, we include stocks listed in their two main exchanges given their equal importance in the countries.It is necessary to emphasize that while the NASDAQ market is the second largest in the United States in terms of market capitalization, our sample excludes stocks traded in this market for two reasons. One, it allows us to compare our results with those of existing US studies that focus on only NYSE and AMEX stocks. Two, the NASDAQ market is a multiple-dealer market and its multiple trades based on the same order might affect the recorded number of buys and sells and hence, P IN estimates.
The initial sample covers 57,892 securities. We merge these securities with the Datastream database to obtain their basic firm-level information by using codes provided by 
The Quality of P IN as a Measure of Information Asymmetry
In our study, a majority of stock exchanges have implemented automated electronic trading systems during our sample period from January 1996 to December 2010. Only the stock exchanges of Egypt, Ireland, Israel, Jordan, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, the U.K., and the United States (i.e., NYSE) started automated trading after 1996. Many of these electronic markets are organized as electronic limit order books. This form of market structure typically has no designated liquidity provider such as a specialist or a dealer. We recognize that such electronic order-driven markets are inconsistent with the market structure type assumed in a P IN model with a central market maker. 7
In this subsection, we examine whether P IN estimated using order flows from electronic limit order books actually perform as a measure of information asymmetry. We perform two different sets of tests to evaluate the quality of P IN estimates. One test follows Easley et al. (1996) If their model accurately estimates the probability of informed trading, they would expect the coefficient on P IN to be positive, implying that the larger the probability of informed trading, the wider are spreads. In addition, their regression analysis also includes trading volume to account for any inventory effect on spreads, and if such effects matter, then trading volume would have a negative impact on spreads.
Following Easley et al. (1996) , we conduct pooled cross-country regressions of spreads, Spread, on both P IN and stock turnover, T urnover, as follows.
We compute two different measures of spreads, the effective spread (ESpread) and quoted spread (QSpread), and for each measure, we calculate an equal-weighted and a volume-weighted average of daily percentage spreads. We also compute the correlations between these spreads and P IN . Easley et al. (1996) . Results in Table 2 further reinforce these findings, thereby validating the quality of P IN estimates. Both P IN EHO and P IN DY have strong positive effects on the two different measures of spreads, while T urnover displays a strong negative effect.
P IN and Proxies for Information Asymmetry at Firm and Country Levels
We now turn to testing the quality of P IN by verifying whether P IN is strongly associated with other measures of information asymmetry that are extensively employed in extant empirical studies. If P IN actually provides an estimate of the probability of information-based trading for each stock, then it should be highly correlated with other measures of information asymmetry. To address this issue, we regress P IN on several firm-and country-level information proxies, separately, while controlling for variables that can potentially affect the relationship between P IN and the information proxy in question.
Drawn from the existing literature, the firm-level measures of information asymmetry are the number of analysts following a firm (Analysts), analyst forecast dispersion (F Disp), press coverage of the firm (P ress), firm age ( All these variables are defined in Appendix B. Panel A of Table 3 shows pooled cross-country regressions of firm-level P IN on each information proxy as well as control variables at the firm level, To obtain the Alpha of a portfolio, we regress each monthly global portfolio excess returns against Fama-French global factors for the global market portfolio (M KT G ), market capitalization (SM B G ), and book-to-market (HM L G ),
where r G p,t is the monthly global portfolio return in excess of a 30-day US Treasury bill rate, the intercept Alpha is the risk-adjusted return, and M KT G is the global market index excess return. the difference in the monthly average return between the three small portfolios and the three big portfolios, and the HM L C factor is the difference in the monthly average return between the two value portfolios and two growth portfolios. We group country-level HM L C factors together to form the global HM L G factor and country-level SM B C factors together to construct the global SM B G factor.
Panel A of Overall, the time-series regression results provide no evidence that asymmetric information proxied by P IN has any effect on equity prices. In subsequent subsections, we provide further analyses to examine whether P IN is priced in a cross-sectional asset pricing framework.
P IN and the Cross-Section of Expected Equity Returns
In this subsection, we conduct asset pricing tests similar to those employed by Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O'Hara (2002) and Duarte and Young (2009) to examine whether the asymmetric information or illiquidity component of P IN is priced in an international setting. Table 5 These results seem to contradict Duarte and Young's (2009) finding of a positive P SOS impact on expected US stock returns for the period from 1983 to 2004. They interpret that high P SOS stocks tend to be very illiquid and hence, have a positive illiquidity premium. While it is plausible that the difference in results may be due to the different sample periods employed in both studies (our sample period is 1996-2010 and theirs is 1983-2004), we concede that the negative P SOS coefficient is puzzling. We, however, leave this puzzle for future research.
One may argue that our results are likely driven by orders submitted by algorithm trading implemented in a multiplicity of markets around the globe. The increase in high-frequency trading accounts for the majority of trading volume in today's markets (see Easley, López de Prado, and O'Hara, 2012) . Such trading algorithms are designed to delay or accelerate trading in reaction to market events within milliseconds. For example, traders may split large orders into multiple small orders, and such orders occurring in short intervals are not truly independent observations. To rule out this alternative interpretation, we calculate the numbers of buyer-and seller-initiated orders by aggregating orders on the same side of the market over short intervals into a single observation in the following ways: (i) aggregating sequential trading at the same price if there is no update in quotes (P IN 1 ), (ii) aggregating sequential trading within 15 seconds if there is no update in quotes (P IN 2 ), and (iii) aggregating sequential trading if there is no update in quotes (P IN 3 ). We
replicate key regression models of Table 5 (i.e., M5 and M12) using these revised P IN estimates;
the results presented in Table 6 remain materially unaltered, suggesting that our main findings are robust to high-frequency trading.
Additional Tests
Consistent with theoretical arguments, 10 our earlier evidence of a generally insignificant P IN effect on expected returns possibly suggests that information-risk measured by P IN is diversifiable.
Thus, it is likely that we can find similar evidence using alternative information-based trading measures. This motivates us to exploit the richness of our database to test whether information risk proxied by alternative trading-based information measures can explain the cross-section of expected stock returns in international markets. If the alternative information-based trading measures, while not P IN , have a significant positive effect on expected stock returns, then we argue that P IN may not be a good proxy for information asymmetry. On the other hand, if the alternative tradingbased information measures also exhibit no significant impact on expected stock returns, then we interpret that information risk related to trading-based measures, in general, is not priced.
Given that we cannot exhaust the many different measures of informed trading in the existing literature, we select the following four measures that we consider to be more popularly employed in extant empirical studies. The first measure is Hasbrouck's (1991) measure of relative trade informativeness, R 2 w (equation (6), p. 577), and
R 2 w is the coefficient of determination in a regression of price innovation w on trade innovation x.
w reflects the market's updates to the available information set, whereas x reflects the market's signal of private information through trading. The second measure is Huang and Stoll's (1996) percentage price impact measure, %P Impact,
where Q it is a binary variable that equals +1 for buyer-initiated orders and −1 for seller-initiated orders; M i,t+30 is the mid-point of the first quote reported at least 30 minutes after the transaction.
%P Impact incorporates liquidity providers' quote revisions following a series of buyer-or sellerinitiated orders. We employ Huang and Stoll's (1997) adverse selection component as the third measure (equation (23), p. 1014).
where M t is the quote midpoint calculated from bid-ask quotes that occur just before a transaction, S is a constant spread, π is the probability of trade reversals, and Q t is a buy-sell trade indicator that equals +1 for a buyer-initiated trade and −1 for a seller-initiated. α is the adverse selection component of the half-spread, and β is the inventory holding component. The conditional expectation of the trade indicator at time t − 1, given Q t−2 , is shown in equation (21) of Huang and
Stoll,
Esimating the preceding two equations simultaneously, we obtain an estimate of the adverse selection component, α, and label it α HS . The last measure is the asymmetric information parameter derived from Madhavan, Richardson, and Roomans's (1997) model for transaction price changes (equation (4), p. 1042), 11
where p t − p t−1 is the change in transaction prices, φ is the cost of supplying liquidity, θ is the asymmetric information parameter, ρ is the autocorrelation of the order flow, and x t is the trade initiation variable. To distinguish the different notations used in this study, we use θ M RR to denote the asymmetric information parameter θ.
We proceed to replicate Fama-MacBeth regressions of M2 and M5 from Table 7 .
Consistent with those of Table 5 , information-based trading measures, in general, exhibit no strongly significant effect on expected stock returns; only Stoll's (1996, 1997) privateinformation measures, %P Impact and α HS , have a marginally significant effect. The coefficient estimates of %P Impact and α HS are 18.738 (t = 1.76) in M3 and 10.641 (t = 1.88) in M5, respectively. But when jointly estimated with Illiquidity, they become statistically insignificant.
Illiquidity, however, continues to have a consistently, positive effect on expected stock returns.
Overall, these results suggest that information risk proxied not only by P IN , but also by four alternative trading-based measures, in general, is not robustly priced.
Summary
The pricing of information asymmetry has become a recent subject of debate in both theoretical and empirical asset pricing and microstructure literatures. On the one hand, Easley et al. (1996) The Alpha is the intercept obtained from regressing monthly portfolio excess returns (r G p ) against global Fama-French factors for the global market portfolio (M KT G ), size factor (SM B G ), and book-to-market factor (HM L G ).
We construct single-sorted P IN quintile portfolios as follows. For each year and for each country, we first rank stocks based on their prior-year P IN estimates from the lowest to the highest and then group these stocks into quintiles based on their ranked P IN s. We then combine stocks of the same P IN quintile-ranking from each country into a global P IN -ranked quintile. For example, the Low P IN portfolio consists of stocks in the lowest P IN quintile portfolio from their respective countries, and the High P IN portfolio contains those from the highest P IN quintile portfolio. The remaining portfolios are formed in a similar manner. We repeat this procedure annually. For the double-sorted portfolios, we do the same, except that we first form three groups of stocks from each country based on their prior-year market capitalization (Size), and within each size portfolio, we form five groups of stocks based on their Table 5 using P IN estimated from the number of buy or sell orders by (i) aggregating sequential trading at the same price if there is no update in quotes (P IN 1 ), (ii) aggregating sequential trading within 15 seconds if there is no update in quotes (P IN 2 ), and (iii) aggregating sequential trading if there is no update in quotes (P IN 3 ). It shows time-series averages of the slope coefficients from the following cross-sectional regression. International Country Risk Guide
